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I. INTRODUCTION
The twelve-year history of stock index futures contracts has been
marked by great success both in the United States and in many other
countries. Two years after the product was introduced in 1982, the
"notional," i.e., underlying, or dollar value of trading on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) S&P 500 Stock Price Index futures con-
tract surpassed the dollar volume of trading at the New York Stock
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Exchange (NYSE).' Moreover, "as investors go increasingly global
and market turbulence grows, stock index futures are emerging as the
favorite way for nimble money managers to deploy their funds. In-
deed,.., in most major markets, trading in stock index futures now
exceeds the buying and selling of actual shares."2
This article presents an overview of the history of stock index fu-
tures products, including an examination of their role in the market
decline of 1987 and their broad acceptance in international markets.
It concludes with a review of the current regulatory impediments to
stock index futures trading.
II. DEFINITION OF STOCK INDEX FuTuREs
A stock index futures contract is an agreement to buy or to sell
the value of a specific stock index at an agreed price at a future "set-
tlement date." A futures position established on an organized ex-
change can be offset at any time during the life of the contract by
taking an opposite position and closing out the contract. Exchange-
traded futures contracts are marked-to-the-market daily and the gains
or losses are settled daily. Thus, whether the market user is a hedger
or speculator, the discipline of the exchange system requires actual
cash to move at least daily as the value of the contract fluctuates. On
the settlement date, the contract is "settled" to the value of the under-
lying stocks in the index.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF STOCK INDEX FuTuREs
While organized futures markets were active in the United States
as early as the 1840's, for approximately one hundred years only stor-
able United States farm commodities, as well as coffee, sugar, cocoa,
silver and platinum, etc. were considered candidates for futures trad-
ing. Until the 1960's, futures contracts were based on physical and
storable commodities. The development of the first strictly non-stor-
able commodity did not occur until 1964 when the CME introduced its
successful Live Cattle futures contract.
An even more significant innovation was the initiation of futures
trading on financial instruments. This occurred in May, 1972 when the
1 In 1994, the notional value of the volume S&P 500 contract at the CME was $4.389
trillion.
2 Suzanne McGee, Fund Managers Get a Jump With Stock-Index Futures, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 1995 at C1.
3 Although the focus of this article is stock index futures, stock index options play a simi-




CME introduced futures trading based on foreign currencies through
its affiliate, the International Monetary Market. These were the first
futures contracts based on financial rather than tangible assets. Nev-
ertheless, the foreign exchange rates, i.e., Deutschmark, British Pound
Sterling, Japanese Yen, etc., which were the subject of these contracts
were physically delivered on settlement.
Only one year later in April, 1973, the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBT) created another major innovation in finance: the establish-
ment of an exchange market in put and call options on listed stocks
through the creation of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange
(CBOE). Although licensed as a National Securities Exchange and
regulated by the SEC, the market was established based on funda-
mental elements of United States futures markets: standardized con-
tract terms and conditions, certificate-less trading, daily mark-to-the-
market, and the severing of the link between the buyer and seller
through an exchange-guaranteed clearing house.4
The next step in the evolution of futures trading occurred with
the introduction of futures contracts based on interest-bearing securi-
ties. The contract based on GNMA securities listed by the CBT dur-
ing September, 1975, and the ninety-day Treasury Bill contract listed
by the CME on January, 1976, were the first interest rate futures con-
tracts, They were followed by other futures contracts also based on
government securities, such as the one-year Treasury bill, Treasury
bonds, and four-year Treasury notes. Treasury bill and Treasury bond
futures saw gradual acceptance from inception, but their success was
insured by increased levels.of interest rate volatility during the highly
inflationary period of the late 1970s and early 1980s. A major study of
the impact of financial futures markets by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Security and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) concluded that the ability of primary government securities
dealers to hedge their positions with futures decreased the cost of issu-
ing United States debt.5
Against this backdrop, the CME, following a legislative change to
permit the creation of futures contracts that employed a method of
4 William J. Brodsky, Rules of the CBOE, 6 REv. SEC. REG. 897 (1973).
5 BOARD OF GoVERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE EF-
FECrS ON THE ECONOMY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OMriONS (1984) (submitted to the Com-
mittee on Agriculture and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives and to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry and the Commit-
tee on Banking of the Senate in December 1984).
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cash settlement rather than physical delivery, introduced in December
1981, the Eurodollar futures contract based on The London Interbank
Offered Rates (LIBOR) and settled in cash to an index of prices es-
tablished by surveying major United Kingdom banks. This not only
established the viability of creating a hedging vehicle that did not re-
sult in physical delivery at the end of the contract, but also paved the
way for the introduction of a cash-settled futures contract on a basket
of stocks. The Eurodollar futures contract now is the most actively
traded, most widely held futures contract in the world.6
Stock index futures were logical extensions of futures contracts
based on interest rates. The most popular stock index futures contract
is the CME's Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 Stock Price Index fu-
tures contract. Beginning in 1983, the CBOE introduced cash settled
options on the CBOE 100 (later renamed the S&P 100) due to con-
cerns that the S&P 500 futures contract would drain volume from the
CBOE's very successful market of options on individual stocks.
A. Indexation and the Equity Markets
Participants in the equity market utilize stock index futures and
options in a variety of ways as an adjunct to their portfolio strategies.
Investors have long followed stock indices as a measure of stock mar-
ket performance. For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has
been a prominent measure of United States stocks since its introduc-
tion in 1884. Moreover, the concept of indexing a portfolio to a broad
stock index as a means of investing in a "market portfolio" emerged in
the 1960's from Harry Markowitz's 1952 paper on portfolio theory
and from William Sharpe's 1964 Capital Asset Pricing Model.7 This
concept was further developed in the random walk concept of Burton
Malkiel in his well known work on the "Random Walk Theory,"8
which clearly asserted that it was very difficult for most portfolio man-
agers to outperform, over a period of time, a basket of diversified
common stocks, i.e., the S&P 500 index.
However, it was not until the mid-1970s that fund managers be-
gan to invest in portfolios that mimicked a particular stock index or to
compare their performance to a stock index as a benchmark. Entire
6 With a notional value of one million dollars, average daily volume through December 31,
1994 for Eurodollar futures and options was 690,539 contracts per day and open interest in these
contracts was 4.039 million positions on December 31, 1994.
7 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FrN. 77 (1952); William Sharpe, Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
8 BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET (1973).
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portfolios of stocks could and still can be acquired or sold by routing
simultaneous orders to stock exchange specialists for all the individual
stocks in the portfolio. However, the strategy of diversifying a portfo-
lio by replicating a stock index would be facilitated if complete bas-
kets of stocks could be traded as a unit. The development of
computerized routing systems, such as the NYSE's Designated Order
Turnaround system (DOT), was more efficient and less expensive than
the traditional manual system of delivering buy and sell orders to the
stock exchange floor. Although originally designed to handle small
orders for one hundred to five hundred shares, the "list processing"
feature, developed by the NYSE at the behest of major brokerage
firms, paved the way for the automated purchase and sale of "bas-
kets" of stocks. The computerized transmission of orders through sys-
tems such as DOT and the computer programs to select and/or create
portfolios gave portfolio and basket trading the name of "program
trading."
In February, 1982, the Kansas City Board of Trade launched the
first futures contract on a stock index, the Value Line Composite In-
dex. The NYSE's futures affiliate, the New York Futures Exchange,
followed with futures on the NYSE composite index in May, 1982. In
April, 1982, the CME launched a futures contract on the S&P 500
Stock Index. Since the S&P 500 Stock Index is the most widely ac-
cepted stock index benchmark of institutional investors, and because
the CME's market had the most volume and liquidity, the S&P 500
stock index futures immediately became the dominant stock index fu-
tures contract. Futures and option contracts on a multiplicity of other
stock indices were subsequently launched in the United States and in
the majority of other countries with well-developed stock markets.
IV. USES OF STOCK INDEX FUTUREs
By using futures contracts based on a broad index of stocks, eq-
uity investors effectively accomplish two basic objectives: they can
"buy" or "sell" the market, and they can hedge against market risk.
Speculators in equities profit from general price movement in the
markets by buying a bullish market or selling a bearish one. Until the
introduction of stock index futures, speculators could satisfy this ob-
jective only by dealing in groups of stock or individual stock options,
i.e., puts and calls, whose price movements were closely related to the
general market. This strategy can prove unsatisfactory, however,
since the prices of individual stocks are influenced by firm-specific in-
formation. Before the advent of stock index futures, mutual funds,
253
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that were composed of groups of stocks selected because their price
behavior closely tracked an index of overall market movement, could
be used to buy the market. But mutual funds are not well suited to
trading or use by institutions; they cannot be sold short and timing is
difficult. Thus, stock index futures provide a valuable instrument for
buying, selling, or hedging "the market."
The introduction of stock index futures contracts presented hedg-
ers with a unique opportunity. Unlike speculators, who are interested
in profiting from general moves in market prices, hedgers seek to in-
sulate portfolios or individual stocks from such moves. The futures
contract meets the needs of an equity portfolio manager who antici-
pates a bearish period in the market that could erode the value of a
fundamentally sound portfolio that the manager is unable or unwilling
to sell (e.g., the manager feels the portfolio will outperform the mar-
ket over time). Stock index futures provide the manager the ability to
hedge by "shorting" the market. If the manager's expectations are
correct, and the market deteriorates, the profit on futures will com-
pensate for the loss on the portfolio.
During the past twelve years, United States stock index futures
have become essential to managing institutional portfolios. Many
large pension fund managers now find it extremely difficult to manage
their portfolios without stock index futures. According to a recent
survey by Pensions and Investments, one-third of the top two hundred
pension plans in the United States use stock index futures, including
the pension managers of such firms as: General Motors, International
Paper, RJR Nabisco, J.C. Penney, Sears Roebuck, Shell Oil, ALCOA,
AT&T, Ameritech, IBM, and Exxon.' Stock index futures are also
heavily used by money managers, mutual funds, endowments, insur-
ance companies, and the managed futures fund community. In his
1988 Congressional testimony, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, said that stock index fu-
tures and options "... provide economic value to their users. By en-
abling pension funds and other institutional users to hedge and adjust
positions quickly and inexpensively, these instruments have come to
play an important role in portfolio management."' 1
9 See The Largest Pension Funds, Pensions and Investments, Jan. 24, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Bankng Library, Peninv File.
10 Financial Market Regulatory Reform, Part 11: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energyand Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.




The advent of derivative" products have allowed portfolio man-
agers to dramatically alter the investment process. Futures and op-
tions have given users the capability to enhance fund performance,
significantly reduce transaction costs, and alter the risk-return charac-
teristics of their portfolios in order to enhance performance and better
serve their customers. Not only have sophisticated users benefitted
from the creation of futures and options, individuals benefit from
these sophisticated money management techniques through invest-
ment in pension funds, mutual funds, insurance investments, and self-
directed retirement plans.
The chart below highlights reasons why investors use stock index
futures. Specifically, fiduciaries use them for hedging market risk, as-
set allocation, cash equitization, indexation, income enhancement, and
lowering transaction costs.












The prospectus of the currently 9.2 billion dollar Vanguard Index
Trust, which tracks the S&P 500 Index, provides insight into how a
public, no load, and retail-oriented open-ended mutual fund uses
stock index futures and options:
Futures contracts and options may be used for several reasons - to
maintain cash reserves while remaining fully invested, to facilitate trad-
ing, reduce transaction costs or to seek higher investment returns when a
11 A "derivative" is generally defined as an instrument whose value is based upon, or derived
from, some underlying index, reference rate, security, commodity, or other asset. See, eg.,
GROUP OF THIRTY GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVEs: PRAcnCES AND PRIN-
ciPLEs 2 (1993).
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futures contract is priced more attractively than the underlying equity,
security or index. A portfolio may not use futures contracts or options
to leverage its net assets.13
This illustrates how an investment company can use a stock index
futures contract as an investment tool but not as a speculative vehicle.
A recent study by the Mid America Institute for Public Policy has
quantified the significant cost savings of using exchange-listed deriva-
tives as "typically on the order of five to twenty percent of the costs of
using the cash market.' 14
V. GLOBALIZATION OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES
The CME stock index complex currently maintains ninety-six
percent of the market share measured in United States stock index
futures volume and ninety-eight percent of the market share mea-
sured by open interest.' In 1984, the notional value of trading the
S&P 500 surpassed the dollar volume of trading at the NYSE. This
continues today. This pattern holds true in numerous other countries
where the value of stock index futures exceeds the volume in the un-
derlying stock markets, such as Japan, France, United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, Brazil, and South Africa. 6 The following graph shows the ratio
of equity index futures dollar volume to the dollar volume in the un-
derlying stock markets:
13 VANGUARD INDEX TRUST, PROSPECrUS 14 (1992) (originally published Mar. 15,1992 and
revised Apr. 10, 1992).
14 DANIEL R. SIEGEL, MID-AMERICA INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC PoLIcY RESEARCH, TRANSAC-
TION CoSTs FOR ASSET ALLOCATION 2 (1991).
15 Open interest is defined as the total number of futures or options contracts of a given
commodity that have not yet been offset by an opposite futures or option transaction, not ful-
filled by delivery of the underlying instrument or its cash equivalent (depending on the design of
the futures contract) or by option exercise.
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In mature markets - countries with large volumes of futures
trading or countries which have been trading futures for a number of
years, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Japan - the stock index futures market share tends to be at or below
ten percent of all futures volume. This is due not to any deficiency in
stock index business, but rather to a well-developed business in other
areas, especially in interest rates. However, in most other countries,
stock indexes account for a much larger share of all futures and op-
tions trading: more than ninety percent in Hong Kong, South Africa,
and the Netherlands; and twenty-five percent or more in Austria,
Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Singapore, Denmark, Brazil, and
Germany.
A. Globalization in the 1990's
The United States no longer dominates the world's capital mar-
kets. In fact, according to the following graph, United States stock
market capitalization only represents between one-third and forty
percent of world stock market capitalization.18 Investors seeking
higher returns and greater diversification are forced to look beyond
their borders for investment opportunities.
17 GoiMAN SACHS, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES TRADING IN 1993 10a (June 1995).
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Source: Morgan Stanley, Jan. 1995.19
Institutional investors, because of their increased sophistication,
relaxed regulatory concerns, easier access to clearing and custodial
services, and improvements in global telecommunications and the
ability to analyze international companies, are quickly becoming more
interested in foreign stock index products. Because of these develop-
ments, investors began demanding easier ways to gain access to for-
eign markets. Stock index futures have greatly facilitated access to
the equity markets of those countries. As sophisticated market users
become familiar with how stock index futures permit efficient access
to equity markets, the business of both domestic and international
stock index futures markets has grown. Much of that growth has been
fueled by United States based broker-dealers who are the major users
of stock index futures and options markets on behalf of clients and for
their own accounts.20
The popularity of stock index futures abroad confirms that these
products can thrive in non-United States financial markets. Successful
stock index futures products can be found everywhere. Many coun-
tries that do not have stock index products are scrambling to intro-
duce them. Stock index futures markets are currently planned in
Korea and Thailand. As of December, 1994, the following stock index
futures and options contracts were traded on twenty-six exchanges in
twenty-one countries. A list of those actively traded contracts follows:
19 Id.






American Stock Exchange (AMEX) - New XMI Options
York, NY Institutional Index Options
S&P Midcap Options




Belgian Futures & Options Exchange (Belfox) Bel-20
Bel-20 Options
BM&F - Sao Paulo, Brazil Ibovespa
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) S&P 100 Option CBOE Mexico
S&P 500 Option Index Options
CBOEIS&P Sectors Options CBOE Israel
Russell 2000 Option Index Options
FTSE 100 Index Option Nasdaq 100
Biotech Index Option Options
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) S&P 500 Futures and Futures Options
S&P 400 Futures and Futures Options
Nikkei 225 Futures and Futures Options
Major Market Index Futures and Futures
Options
Russell 2000 Futures and Futures Options
Commodity Exchange (COMEX) - New Europtop Index Futures
York, NY
DTB - Frankfurt, Germany DAX Futures and Options
European Option Exchange (EOE) - Dutch Top 5 Index Option
Amsterdam, Netherlands EOE Index Option
Finnish Options Market Fox Index and Options
Fox Index Options
Copenhagen Stock Exchange and the Danish KFX Index Futures and Options
Gurantee Fund for Danish Options and
Futures (FUTOP)
Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE) Hang Seng Index Futures and Options
Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) Value Line Futures
Mini Value Line Futures
and Futures Options
Italian Stock Exchange - Milan, Italy MIB-30
London International Financial Futures FTSE 100 Futures
Exchange (LIFFE) FT Mid 250 Index and Options
March6 a Terme Internationale de France CAC 40 Futures
(MATIF) - Paris, France
March6 des Options Negotiables de Paris CAC 40 Options
(MONEP) - Paris, France CAC 40 Long Term Options
Meff Renta Variable (MEFF RV) - Madrid, IBEX 35 Futures & Options
Spain IBEX 35 Options
Northwestern Journal of
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EXCHANGE INDEX
New Zealand Futures & Options Exchange Forty Index Futures
(NZFOE) - Aukland, New Zealand
New York Futures Exchange (NYFE) NYSE Composite Futures & Options
New York Securities Exchange (NYSE) NYSE Composite Options
Osaka Securities Exchange Nikkei 225 Futures & Options
Nikkei 300 Futures & Options
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) OBX Option
(OTOB) - Vienna, Austria ATX Futures
and Options
Pacific Stock Exchange - San Francisco Wilshire Small Cap Index Option
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) KBW Bank Index Option Gold/Silver
Utility Index Index
Value Line Index Bank Index
Phone Index Big Cap Index
Semiconductor Index OTC Index
South Africa Futures Exchange (SAFEX) - All Share Index Futures & OptionsJohannesburg, South Africa
Singapore International Monetary Exchange Nikkei 225 Futures & Options
(SIMEX)
Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) All-Ordinaries, Futures and
Options
Swiss Options Financial Futures Exchange SMI Futures and
(SOFFEX) - Zurich, Switzerland Options
OM Stockholm AB Swedish OMX Futures & Options
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Ltd. MAOF-25 Index Options
Toronto Stock Exchange TSE 35 Futures & Options
Tokyo Stock Exchange TOPIX Futures & Options
Although the United States continues to have the most active
stock index contract, when measured in dollar terms, the growth of
stock index futures abroad is significant. The United States and Japan
together account for seventy-two percent of the dollar value of world
stock index trading. With the addition of Singapore, Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, this number increases to ninety-five
percent. The other countries make up the remaining five percent.21
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21 See Michael Gorham, Stock Index Futures: A 12-Year Review, Address at the Korea Fu-
tures Management Association Conference (May 21, 1994).
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While the international trading world has gotten smaller and eas-
ier to access, there remain regulatory restrictions on the ability of
United States investors to obtain access to the global stock index fu-
tures and options markets. These regulatory restrictions are discussed
more fully below.
B. Trends in the Industry
As the United States stock market continues to mature, investors
are trading not only large-capitalization stock indices, but are also in-
terested in using small- and middle-capitalization stock indices as well.
In response to this demand, the CME now lists stock index futures
contracts comprising all three market segments for a total of over
ninety percent of the United States market capitalization. In the
United States, the S&P 500 continues to be the accepted industry
benchmark for large capitalization common stocks and garners the
majority of stock index trading volume. Futures contracts on middle-
capitalization and small-capitalization stocks have grown slowly. Nev-
ertheless, volume in the past year indicates an increasing desire by
portfolio managers and others to use these products as they diversify
their portfolios. Moreover, outside the United States, markets in
London have witnessed the introduction of products on middle-capi-
talization stocks, e.g., The Financial Tmes Mid-250 Index futures
contract.
22 GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET REVIEW 10a (Jan. 1995).
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VI. COMPLEMENTARY RELATIONSHIP wrTH TRADTONAL
EQurry MARKETs
It is now well accepted that the market in stock index futures is
directly linked to the underlying equity markets. This concept was
confirmed in the "Brady Report"2 3 with the assertion that these mar-
kets, taken together, represent "one market" and not several in-
dependent trading markets.
For instance, options market makers on securities exchanges have
several ways of hedging their market making risk. Market makers in
index options on a securities exchange such as the CBOE primarily
use stock index futures on the CME to hedge their risk. As a result,
since 1989, the CME and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC),
the clearing entity for all United States stock option exchanges, devel-
oped a "cross margining" system for futures and options as described
more fully below.24
Moreover, stock index futures have not only become an integral
part of the equity markets, but have also helped to fuel their growth.
The introduction of stock options in 1973 and stock index futures and
options in 1982, along with the development of more sophisticated
computer technology, and the growing importance of the institutional
investor, helped fuel the dramatic growth of United States securities
markets. The following chart demonstrates growth in trading volume
for NYSE issues from 1973 - 1994.
23 1988 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 8 [hereinaf-
ter BRADY REPORT].
24 In addition to the CBOE and AMEX, as of July 6, 1993, the Intermarket Clearing Corpo-
ration, the futures affiliate of OCC, and the clearing entity for The New York Futures Exchange,
joined the arrangement.
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Similar volume growth has been experienced in stock markets of
other countries after the introduction of stock index futures and
options.
The phenomenal growth of trading volume in stock index futures
and options and in shares of the underlying stocks in the last two de-
cades tends to provide proof of the symbiotic relationship between the
derivative and underlying markets for stocks. Another illustration of
this relationship is contained in the chart below. 5
CME S&P 500, NYSE& NASDAQ











82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
U CME NYSE S NASDAQ
Source: CME Index Marketing, NYSE, and Nasdaq
Fund managers and other institutional investors trade stock index
derivatives because they are flexible, inexpensive instruments to
hedge, index, or rebalance portfolios. They are also used to time the
market and to carry out asset reallocations. In addition, trading in
stock index derivatives facilitates price discovery. Futures and options
markets have emerged as natural complements to the underlying eq-
uity markets. This has enhanced the appeal of equity markets and has
fostered the formation of capital. Without stock index futures and op-
tions and other related derivatives, corporate borrowers would have
to pay more for their capital. Stock index futures are not only an inte-
25 The majority of stocks comprising the S&P 500 index are listed on the NYSE or the Nas-
daq Stock Market. The Nasdaq Stock Market is an electronic trading system in which trades are





gral part of the derivatives markets, but also have caused a revolution
in corporate finance.26
VII. IMPACr OF EQUrrY DERIVATIVES ON GLOBAL MARKETS
Although the market decline of October, 1987 caused a storm of
criticism about the consequences of futures markets, the overwhelm-
ing conclusion of the dozens of economic studies that were conducted
about the market decline strongly supported the position that stock
index futures provide an important risk management vehicle and that
the stock index futures contracts are an integral and complementary
part of one global equities market.
A. The Role of Stock Index Derivatives in the Market Decline of
October 1987
Few events of the last two decades have left as deep or as lasting
an impression on financial markets as the world-wide stock market
decline of October, 1987. On October 19, 1987, the S&P 500 index
dropped by more than twenty percent. From the close of trading on
Thesday, October 13, to the close of trading on Monday, October 19,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost approximately a third of its
value. Stock prices in Japan and Europe also plunged, some by as
much as forty percent.27 Studies have shown that countries which had
stock index futures or options had crashes of the same average magni-
tude as countries without these instruments. 8 This spectacular price
drop was accompanied by high trading volume. The price volatility
which had in fact preceded the events of October, 1987 lingered for a
few months while trading volume fell to very low levels.
The convergence of several fundamental economic factors - the
prior increase in interest rates, bleaker earnings expectations follow-
ing negative trade and budget deficits, greater perceived uncertainty
as indicated by the rise in options' implied volatilities, and the filing of
new tax legislation for takeovers - is sufficient to explain why stock
prices should have declined right around October, 1987. The severity
26 See generally Robert Lenzner and William Heuslein, The Age of Digital Capitalism,
Fonams, Mar. 29, 1993, at 62-72.
27 See A.G. Malliaris and Jorge Urrutia, Linkages of National Stock Markets: Statistical Evi-
dence Before During, and After the October 1987 Crash, 4 RECENT DEv. INT'L BANKING 336-69
(1991).
28 R. Richard, The International Crash of October 1987 (1988) (working paper No. 9-88, on
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and abruptness of the decline and the disruption it caused in the oper-
ation of financial exchanges were, nonetheless, considered puzzling.
Attention soon focused on the role of stock index futures trading
in the financial crisis (along with computerized program trading, and
other relatively recent and often misunderstood trading innovations).
The Brady Report emphasized that "the market for stocks, stock in-
dex futures and stock options - are in fact one market" and that "It]he
instruments - stocks, stock index futures and stock options - are
fundamentally driven by the same economic factors. 29 Thus, on Oc-
tober 19, 1987, "[p]ortfolio insurers and other institutional investors
sold in both the stock market and the stock index futures market.
Selling pressure in the futures market was transmitted to the stock
market by the mechanism of index arbitrage. ' 30 This procedure, as
with all types of arbitrage, consists of the simultaneous buying and
selling of similar financial instruments in different markets to take ad-
vantage of price discrepancies. In the case of stock index arbitrage,
stocks can be sold and futures purchased or vice versa.
The "cascade" theory that emerged in reports critical of stock in-
dex futures markets ascribed the cause of the market decline as
"short" portfolio hedging strategies, e.g., portfolio insurance, and
stock index arbitrage trades, interacting to "cause a downward spiral
in stock prices.'
29 BRADY REPORT, supra note 21, at Vi.
30 BRADY REPORT, supra note 21, at vi.
31 CFTC DIVISION OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKERS,
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET AcrvrrY
DURING OCTOBER 1987 1-2 (1988). A small selection of the myriad studies of the crash of Octo-
ber 1987 is listed below:
GOVERNMENT STUDIES AND REPORTS
BRADY REPORT, supra note 21.
SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THm OCTOBER 1987 MARKEr BREAK (1988).
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS (1988).
DEAN FURBUSH, SEC OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, PROGRAM TRADING AND PRICE
MOVEMENTS AROUND THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1989).
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, AND COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS (1988).
CFTC DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS, ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN THE CHICAGO
BOARD OF TRADE'S MAJOR MARKET INDEX FUTURES CONTRACT ON OCTOBER 20, 1987
(1988).
CF'C FINAL REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET Acnvrry DURING
OCTOBER 1987 (1988).
CFTC FoLLow-Up REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES MAR-




The presumed adverse effects of stock index arbitrage and the
cascade theory were put in question by subsequent studies which ana-
lyzed the relationship between index arbitrage trades, program trades,
and intraday price variations3 2 on and around October 19. The princi-
pal findings of these studies were: (1) index arbitrage sell trades ac-
counted for only a small percentage of NYSE volume in this period
(eleven percent of total NYSE volume on October 19),3 3 (2) stock
CFTC INTERIM REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET AcrivrrY DURING
OCTOBER 1987 (1987).
GENERAL ACcOuNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987
CRASH (1988) (report to Congressional requesters).
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STOCK MARKET CRASH OF OCTOBER 1987 (1988) (prelim-
inary report to Congress).
GREGORY DUFFEE, PAUL KuPiEcK AND A. PATRICIA WHITE, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, A PRIMER ON PROGRAM TRADING AND STOCK PRICE
VOLATILITY: A SURVEY OF THE ISSUES AND THE EVIDENCE (1990).
EXCHANGE STUDIES AND REPORTS
CICAGO BOARD OF TRADE'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS (1987).
N. KArZENBACH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING
AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987).
MERTON MILLER, JOHN HAWKE, BURTON MALKIEL, AND MYRON SCHOLES, PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON THE CoMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE Ex-
CHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (1987).
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, FINAL REPORT OF THE REGULATORY
REvIEw TASK FORCE (1988).
ACADEMIC STUDIES
William J. Brodsky, A View from the CME, in THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECH-
NOLOGY FOR THE SECURITIES MARKETS (Lucas et al. eds.).
Franklin R. Edwards, Studies of the 1987 Stock Market Crash: Review and Appraisal, 1 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 231-51 (1988).
Eugene Fama, Perspectives on October 1987 or What Did We Learn From the Crash? (1988)
(on file with the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago).
Sanford J. Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility
of Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275 (1988).
Sanford J. Grossman, Program Trading and Market Volatility: A Report on Interday Rela-
tionships, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1988, at 18.
Hayne Leland, Portfolio Insurance and October 19, CAL MOr. REV. (1988).
Hayne Leland and Mark Rubinstein, Comments on the Market Crash- Six Months After, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3 (1988).
Richard Roll, The International Crash of October, 1987, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at
19-35.
Mark Rubinstein, Portfolio Insurance and the Market Crash, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan-Feb.
1988, at 38-47.
32 Intraday Margin is defined as the additional margin deposited by a clearing member firm
to an exchange clearinghouse during periods of great market volatility or in the case of high-risk
accounts.
33 Portfolio insurance trading accounted for less than ten percent of trading volume, but
other less visible short hedge trades might have been more significant. Hayne Leland, On the
Stock Market Crash and Portfolio Insurance 7-15 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of California at Berkeley) has pointed out that portfolio insurance, a hedging
technique which per se does not necessarily convey information, can cause discontinuous price
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price volatility persisted after October 20 in spite of the restrictions
imposed by the NYSE on index arbitrage trades, (3) since index arbi-
trage trades occurred at different times than portfolio hedge sales,
there was little opportunity for the two to interact, (4) the pressure of
index arbitrage sell programs on stock prices was very short-lived, and
(5) the parallel decrease in stock index futures and cash market prices
showed that stock prices were adjusting to a lower equilibrium level,
which essentially did not change through the end of October. In addi-
tion, a little-known fact regarding trading on Monday, October 19,
was that "straight program" trading was more prevalent that day
than index arbitrage trading. The following chart illustrates this
occurrence:
adjustments if investors misinterpret the trades it entails as information-based. Leland argued
that "sunshine trading," i.e., the announcement by portfolio hedgers of their demands prior to
trading, would have alleviated the problem.
34 "Straight program" trading refers to index trading other than through arbitrage. Whereas
arbitrage refers to trading based on abnormal price differences between the futures contract and
the underlying stock index portfolio, straight program trading refers to trading based on the
direction of the market as a whole. Much of the straight programs were transactions of stock
baskets and did not have a futures dimension.
Stock Index Futures
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The unusual behavior of the S&P 500 basis35 provides the best
insight into the details of market activity during these few days. At
the close of Friday, October 16, the S&P 500 basis became negative,
which suggested a delinking between the cash and futures markets. 6
This delinking resulted from trading interruptions in S&P 500 compo-
nent stocks.3 7 Trading interruptions developed because NYSE spe-
cialists had difficulty in handling the surge in order flow because they
could not absorb the unusually large order imbalances which had ac-
cumulated. These order imbalances were particularly pronounced for
component stocks of the S&P 500 index which by definition, are the
most widely held stocks. This might explain why the decrease in
NYSE stocks in the S&P 500 index ended up seven percent greater
than that of stocks not in the index.38 Trading in stock index futures
was not similarly constrained. Order imbalances, coupled with the ru-
mors which circulated about wide-spread failures of brokers and mar-
ket makers, and the fear of an imminent market collapse aggravated
the panic of investors and made the collapse self-fulfilling.
Prior to the crash, Merton Miller 3 9 had warned that cash and fu-
tures markets might not have the capacity to handle very large order
flows and that stale transactions prices would send false signals to
traders. He predicted that, in the short-term, this illiquidity and lack
of market transparency would exacerbate volatility generated by fun-
damental changes. Miller advocated an improvement in order-
35 "Basis" is defined as the difference between the current cash price and the futures price of
the same underlying commodity. Unless otherwise specified, the price of the nearby futures
contract month is generally used to calculate the basis.
36 Barring significantly negative rates of interest, the cost-of-carry relationship between spot
and futures index prices implies a positive basis. Lawrence Harris, The October 1987 S&P 500
Stock- Futures Basis, 44 J. FIN. 77 (1989) and Allan W. Kleidon, Arbitrage; Nontrading and Stale
Prices: October 1987,65 J. Bus. 483 (1992) are two exhaustive analyses of the October 1987 S&P
500 basis.
37 Kleidon has also provided evidence for the hypothesis that the negative S&P 500 October,
1987 basis and the non-synchronicity between S&P 500 spot and futures prices were caused by
staleness of the prices at which stock transactions were still executed as well as by nontrading in
stocks. Kleidon, supra note 36, at 493-505.
38 The discrepancy between S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 prices disappeared in the first hour
of trading on the next day. See Marshall E. Blume et al., Order Imbalances and Stock Price
Movements on October 19 and 20, 1987, 44 J. FIN. 827 (1989).
39 Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovations Next, in FiNANaCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET
VoLATiLmrr ch. 1 (Mid-America Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Res. ed., 1986). This chapter is based on a
paper presented to the Distinguished Invited Speakers Series at the 1986 Meetings of the West-
em Finance Association, Colorado Springs, June 1986; an earlier version was presented at the
Seminar on Financial Innovation in Leuven, Belgium, in May 1986. See also, Sanford J. Gross-
man and Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 4 J. FrN. 617 (1988); NEw YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, INDEX ARnrRAGE AND VOLATiLrrY G3-1-5 (1990) (paper prepared for




processing ability as the best solution to the problem. The market
congestion which occurred in October, 1987, fit the pattern of Miller's
prediction. It confirmed that a market dominated by large institutions
using computerized portfolio trading technologies and electronic or-
der-routing systems could cripple the existing market making
mechanisms.
In the wake of October, 1987, securities and futures and options
exchanges instituted a battery of measures to enhance inter-market
coordination, increase computer capacity, improve the clearing and
settlement processes, and ensure the adequacy of capital and other
financial requirements. In addition, a new and sophisticated system to
analyze portfolio risk was introduced. In 1988, the CME implemented
Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN), a system for calculating
performance bonds, at both the clearing firm and account levels.
SPAN has become the standard performance bond calculation system
for the futures industry and has been adopted by all United States
futures exchanges and clearing organizations, as well as by not less
than seven foreign futures exchanges and two clearing organizations.
The NYSE increased capital requirements for specialists and member
firms.
To further inter-market coordination, the NYSE, CME, and
CBOE entered into mutual agreements to share surveillance informa-
tion. In particular, information on large S&P 500 futures transactions
is compared to information on NYSE program trades. Futures ex-
changes have joined the Inter-Market Surveillance Group (ISG),
which includes nine major United States securities exchanges, Nasdaq,
and several foreign exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations.
The objective of the ISG is to share surveillance and investigative in-
formation useful in investigating the inter-market activities of mem-
bers. Exchanges also share financial information on brokerage firms
through two inter-market groups, the Joint Audit Group and the In-
ter-Market Financial Surveillance Group (ISFG), which includes the
financial surveillance staff of futures and securities exchanges, as well
as the National Association of Securities Dealers, National Futures
Association, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Securities
and Exchange Commission. More structured coordination was estab-
lished between exchange clearing houses through the Clearing Organ-
ization and Banking Roundtable, an organization which includes
domestic and foreign futures, options and stock clearing entities, as
well as United States regulators.
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To facilitate the processing of order flows and to give markets
sufficient pause during volatile conditions, an elaborate set of circuit-
breakers40 was instituted. These include coordinated trading halts be-
tween securities and futures and options exchanges,41 NYSE restric-
tions on index arbitrage (collars, side-cars) after specified (i.e., fifty
points for the collar) Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) price
moves, and an expanding schedule of intra-day and daily price limits
for stock index products.
Taken together, these shock absorbers, circuit breakers, collars,
etc., have contributed to the stability of the equity markets. Some
have been used many times, others not at all. Nevertheless, the mar-
ket users seem comfortable with them. This may be due, in large part,
to their predictability. These price limits are based on fixed numbers
rather than a percentage of the underlying index. Although some of
the limits have been changed, these changes have not reflected the
steep rise in the level of the index. Nevertheless, there is no strong
movement to change these limits in proportion to the increases in the




CME LIMITS NYSE LIMITS BREAKERS
YEAR TOTAL LIMITs 50 POINT 1 HOUR AND
REACHED COLLAR LIMITS 2 HOUR TRADING
FOR ALL HALTS
CONTRACTS
1989 5 N/A N/A
1990 12 23 0
1991 5 20 0
1992 5 16 0
1993 2 9 0
1994 18 30 0
40 The term "circuit-breakers" refers to the collection of securities and futures exchange
rules which mandate trading halts, price limits, and restrictions on index arbitrage transactions
following specified changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index or the S&P Stock
Indexes.
41 Participating exchanges include the American Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati
Stock Exchange, Inc, the New York Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the Phila-





One of the specific recommendations42 derived from the 1987
market break was that the CFTC and the SEC work with securities
and futures clearing organizations to develop systems for "cross-mar-
gining" securities and futures positions. The purpose of cross-margin-
ing is to reduce cash flows by allowing participants of both the
securities options and futures markets to gain the benefit of hedged
futures and options positions, thereby reducing the margin require-
ment for these offsetting positions.43 For example, a market maker in
S&P 500 options who has sold on the CBOE can hedge with short
S&P 500 futures on the CME. By virtue of a cross margin agreement
between the two clearing entries of both exchanges, the market
maker's risk is more accurately reflected without the need for posting
margins as if both positions were unhedged.44
Under the terms of the cross-margining agreement, the CME
maintains control of CME-cleared stock index futures and options on
futures while the OCC maintains control of OCC-cleared stock index
options. Participating clearing members grant liens to the CME on
options positions and the OCC on futures positions. Funds paid to
and generated by either the CME or OCC are shared between the two
organizations. Likewise, losses incurred as a result of position liquida-
tions are also shared. Through coordination and exchange of position
data, the CME and OCC are able to provide for a single collection of
margin on these positions. 45
The CME/OCC cross-margining agreement created immediate
benefits for participant firms. During the market turbulence on Octo-
ber 13, 1989 and October 16, 1989, the two firms participating in the
pilot program posted one hundred fifty million dollars less margin in
their cross-margin accounts than they would have paid had they not
been a participant in the program.46 This satisfied a major goal of the
Brady Report: i.e., to reduce the need for funds to flow through the
system during times of stress without increasing risk in the system.
Since its inception, the program has grown substantially.
42 See BRADY REPORT, supra note 21, at viii.
43 1991 SEC REPORT FILED PURSUANT TO SECION 8(A) OF THE MARKET REFoRm Acr OF
1990 27-30 [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
44 See 54 Fed. Reg. 41,195 (1989).
45 SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at 2a.
46 SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at 2a.
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C. Triple Witching Hour and Other Expiration Effects
Until June of 1987, stock index futures, futures options, and stock
options in the United States expired simultaneously at the close of the
third Friday of every quarter. Occasionally, these expirations were ac-
companied by spurts of stock price volatility and high volume. The
last hour of triple expirations therefore came to be known as the noto-
rious "triple-witching hour."'4 7
On June 19, 1987, with the ratification of the SEC and CFTC, the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the New York Futures Exchange, and
the New York Stock Exchange changed the timing and derivation of
the final settlement price of nearly all stock index derivatives. Final
settlement prices are now determined on the morning of the third Fri-
day of the contract month, and are based on the Special Opening
Quotation (SOQ) of the underlying index. The SOQ is computed
from the opening prices of component stocks. On the NYSE, opening
prices are determined in a special market auction conducted by spe-
cialists which clear standing limit orders. The shift to a Friday morn-
ing settlement allows NYSE specialists more time to resolve publicly
disseminated and often large order imbalances.4 8
Almost all derivative markets in Europe and the Pacific have fol-
lowed the United States example and determine stock index final set-
tlement prices on the basis of expiration morning prices, either the
opening prices or some average of mid-morning prices. The major
exception to this practice is the expiration of several United States
stock index options. These options, the most prominent of which is
the S&P 100 option traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
are settled at the close of the third Friday of the contract month. The
continuation of this practice has been the subject of debate between
the SEC and CBOE.4 9
47 "Triple witching hour" began to have a negative connotation on September 21, 1984, fol-
lowing a decrease of 1.32% in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on that Friday's expiration.
John J. Curran, "Witching Days" Without a Curse, FoR-uiN, Jan. 20, 1986, at 110.
48 An additional advantage of the new final settlement procedure is that opening orders on
the NYSE are facilitated through the facility of the Opening Automated Report System (OARS)
on the NYSE which gathers and then nets opening orders.
49 See, eg., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990); Letter to Richard Breeden, Chair-
man SEC from William Brodsky, President CME, dated April 1, 1990; Letter from Richard
Breeden, Chairman, SEC, to William Brodsky, President, CME (May 23, 1990) (on file with
author); and Letter from William Brodsky, President, CME, to Richard Breeden, Chairman,
CFrC (May 31, 1990) (on file with author). See also, Hans R. Stoll and Robert E. Whaley,




A number of empirical studies have analyzed the impact of expi-
rations on stock prices in the United States and in Europe.50 The con-
sensus of these studies is that the increased volatility surrounding
stock index derivative expirations is small, transient, and analogous to
the price effect of large block transactions on stock prices. For exam-
ple, Stoll and Whaley5 estimate that, prior to 1987, the average price
effect (as measured by the magnitude of price reversals immediately
following the expiration) of stock index expirations was only forty
percent of the value of the index at the close. Since June of 1987, the
price effect of stock index expirations in the United States has de-
creased to an even lower number of around twenty percent.52 Part of
this decrease may be attributed to the fact that price pressure effects
related to expiration are now spread between Thursday's close and
Friday's open.
In summary, the price disruptions sometimes caused by stock in-
dex expirations have never been significant or long-lived. These dis-
ruptions reflect the price adjustments made by market makers who
supply liquidity and are therefore exposed to greater risk in very ac-
tive stock markets.
D. The Relationship Between Stock Market Volatility and Stock
Index Derivatives
Episodes such as the stock market declines of October 1987 and
October 1989, and triple-witching hours have caused some regulators,
members of the press, the investment community, and the general
public to believe that stock price volatility of financial markets has
risen in the last two decades.
inafter Stoll and Whaley I]; and Hans R. Stoll and Robert E. Whaley, Expiration-Day Effects:
What has Changed?, FrN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 58-72 [hereinafter Stoll and Whaley II].
50 For sources in the United States, see Stephen P. Ferris et al., A Transaction Data Study of
Stock Returns and Trading Activity During Option Expiration Periods, 5 ADVANCES FUTuREs &
OPrIONS REs. 149 (1991); Robert Klemkosky, The Impact of Option Expirations on Stock Prices,
13 J. FiN. & QuAwrTAl'tvE ANqALYSIS 507 (1978); Stoll and Whaley I, supra note 49, at 16-28;
and Stoll and Whaley II, supra note 49, at 58-72. For Canada, see Trevor W. Chamberlain, Expi-
ration-Day Effects of Index Futures and Options: Some Canadian Evidence, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 67-71. For the U.K., see Peter S. Pope and Pradee Yadav, The Impact of
Option Expiration on Underlying Stocks: The UK Evidence, 19 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 329-44
(1992). For Norway, see Steve Swidler et al., Option Expiration Day Effects in Small Markets:
Evidence from the Oslo Stock Exchange, 3 J. FrN. EN INEERING 177-95 (1994).
51 Stoll and Whatley I, supra note 49, at 16.
52 Stoll and Whaley II, supra note 49, at 58. See also, Chao Chen and James Williams, Triple-
witching Hour, the Change in Expiration 71ming and Stock Market Reaction, 14 J. FUTURES
MARs 275 (1994).
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There is a related and widespread perception that this increase in
volatility does not originate from fundamental economic forces, and
that it is the result of destabilizing speculative or other trading activ-
ity. Increased price volatility is sometimes blamed on: the fickleness
of non-rational investors who follow "fashions and fads, ' 3 large fi-
nancial institutions that use computer-based trading programs to man-
age portfolios of stocks, or the introduction of and trading in stock
index futures and options.
The view that trading in stock index futures exacerbates stock
price volatility has been analyzed extensively - most prominently in
the wave of studies published shortly after the market decline of Octo-
ber 1987. These include well-known studies by the SEC, CFTC, the
NYSE, and a Presidential Task Force. 4 Several explanations have
been proposed to uphold this view.
One argument is that stock index arbitrage strategiess transmit
volatility from a stock index futures market to the underlying stock
market. The fallacy in this argument is that stock index arbitrage
merely transmits to stock prices information which has reached the
futures market a few minutes ahead of the underlying stock market.
This information would have affected stock prices even in the absence
of a futures market. In other words, the role of index arbitrage is
largely relegated to that of a "messenger."5 6 The only distinctive im-
pact which futures trading may have in its role of messenger is to im-
pose a faster, and hence, more abrupt adjustment of stock prices to
53 Robert Shiller, Fashions, Fads and Bubbles in Financial Markets (Feb. 6, 1986) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author). See also, Franklin R. Edwards, Portfolio Insurance and
Other Investor Fashions as Factors in the 1987 Stock Market Crash, 1988 NBER MACROECON.
AiNN. 287-96. See also, ROBERT R. NATHAN Assocs., RE IEw OF INITIAL TRADING EXPERI-
ENCE AT THE CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONs EXCHANGE 61-68 (1974).
54 NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM
TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CuRRENi MARKET PRACICES (1987); SEcUrTES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988); BRADY REPORT, supra note
21; and CFTC REPORT ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET AcrnvrrY DuRINo OC-
TOBER 1987 (1988).
55 Stock index arbitrage refers to simultaneous trades in stock index futures and in portfolios
of the underlying stocks. Arbitrageurs profit from disparities which arise between futures and
spot prices. Since stock index arbitrage smooths out these disparities, it makes both markets
more efficient.
56 Hans R. Stoll and Robert E. Whaley, Stock Market Volatility and Index Futures: Message
Versus Messenger, 4 J. PORTFOUO MGmT. 20-22 (1987-88) and Hans R. Stoll and Robert E.
Whaley, The Dynamics of Stock Index and Stock Index Futures Returns, 25 J. FIN. & QUANTrrA-
TIVE ANALYSIS (1990) (a careful description of the temporal relation between stock index fu-
tures and spot prices). See also, Merton Miller, Index Arbitrage and Volatility (1990)




new information. The resulting increase in the short-run volatility of
stock prices is aggravated when the equity markets are unable to ab-
sorb large variations in the order flow on short notice.57 This phe-
nomenon is not unlike the impact that "block trading" had on the
stock market in the late 1960's and early 1970's as the ramifications of
this practice were being recognized by retail brokers and investors.
A second argument for the proposition that stock index futures
are destabilizing is based on the hypothesis that stock index futures
drain liquidity by "siphoning away trading from the underlying
stocks."'58 In the long-run, this could increase stock market spreads
and destabilize stock prices. However, the dramatic growth of trading
volume in stocks since the inception of stock index derivatives sup-
ports the competing hypothesis.59 Thus, far from draining volume
from the stock market, stock index derivatives nurture trading in
stocks and improve liquidity. Stock index derivatives have attracted a
larger pool of market participants and offer investors efficient and
cost effective risk-sharing opportunities.
The cumulative evidence from empirical studies provides meager
support for the negative perception of stock index futures or even for
the belief that stock market volatility has increased. 6° The majority of
these studies support the view that stock index derivatives improve
the liquidity of underlying markets, and exert a stabilizing influence
on these markets in the long run.
Edwards61 was one of the first to study the effect of the introduc-
tion of stock index futures. He examined daily returns of stocks from
1973 to 1987, and concluded that stock index futures had no destabi-
lizing effect. This conclusion was corroborated by numerous studies,
that looked at daily and intra-day volatility, published in the wake of
the October, 1987, market decline. One recent study by Kamara,
Miller and Siegel examined unconditional and conditional stock price
volatilities for the period from 1976 to 1988 and also concurred in Ed-
57 See B. Wade Brosen, Futures Trading, Transaction Costs, and Stock Market Volatility, 11 J.
FutruREs MARKETS 153 (1991).
58 Hon Choi and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Using Intraday Data to Test for Effects of Index
Futures on the Underlying Stock Markets, 14 J. FUTURES MARKETS 293-322 (1994).
59 Studies have also shown that stock spreads do not widen but narrow following the intro-
duction of derivatives such as stock options.
60 See G. William Schwert, Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Tune?, 44 J. Fm.
1115 (1989) and G.W. Schwert, Stock Volatility and the Crash of 87,3 REv. FIN. STUD. 77 (1990).
61 F.R. Edwards, Does Futures Trading Increase Stock Market Volatility?, Fmi. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 63-69.
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wards' findings.62 Similarly, Bessembinder and Seguin 63 have ana-
lyzed the long-run effect of stock index futures on conditional and
unconditional volatility. They find that futures decrease the condi-
tional, ie., expected volatility of stock prices. A notable exception to
these results is Harris, 64 who found that volatility of daily returns of
S&P 500 stocks to be greater than that of non-S&P 500 stocks since
1982. However, he estimated that the difference in volatility was not
economically significant.
Concerns about stock index futures and apparent fear of their
negative effects on the stock market spread to Japan. Japanese offi-
cials, eager to protect equity market values against the perceived risk
of stock index futures, instituted costly regulatory measures which
were imposed by the powerful Ministry of Finance. These measures
had a perverse effect. Overall trading was not diminished, but the
Osaka Security Exchange (OSE) lost much of its trading volume in
Nikkei 225 Stock Average futures and options to the Singapore Inter-
national Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), where trading has not been
hampered by excessively high margins and high fixed commissions65
as well as market interruptions based on ad hoc decisions when vola-
tility increases. A belated attempt to recapture this volume by intro-
ducing a new Nikkei index - the Nikkei Stock Index 300 - structured
with less prohibitive trading costs has not yet undone the damage.
62 Avraham Kamara et al., The Effect of Futures Trading on the Stability of Standard and
Poor 500 Returns, 12 J. FUTuREs MARKETS 645 (1992). See also, A. Craig MacKinlay and
Krishna Ramaswamy, Index Futures Arbitrage and the Behavior of Stock Index Futures Prices, 1
REV. FiN. STUD. 137-58 (1988); A. Craig MacKinlay and Krishna Ramaswamy, Program Trading
and the Behavior of Stock Index Prices (1987) (Working paper series 30-87, Rodney White
Center for Financial Research, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Jennifer Quinn et
al., Program Trading and Index Arbitrage, in REPORT ON MARKET VoLm.rn'rY AND INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE app. F (1990); Merton H. Miller, Index Arbitrage and Volatility, in REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON MARKET VoT.AxrTY AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE (1990), Sanford J.Grossman,
Program Trading and Market Volatility, Report on Interday Relationships, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
July-Aug. 1988, at 18-28; and Sanford J. Grossman, An Analysis of the Implication for Stock and
Futures Price Volatility of Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275
(1988).
63 Hendrik Bessembinder and Paul J. Seguin, Futures Trading Activity and Stock Price Vola-
tility (1992) (working paper No. 91-12 Mitsui Center, University of Michigan).
64 Lawrence Harris, S&P 500 Cash Stock Price Volatilities, 44 J. FIN. 1155 (1989).
65 See Merton H. Miller, The Economics and Politics of Index Arbitrage in the U.S. and Ja-
pan, 1 PACIFC-BASIN FrN. J. 3 (1993); and Obiyathulla Bacha and A. Fremault Vila, Futures
Markets, Regulation and Volatility: The Case of the Nikkei Stock Index Futures Markets (Nov.
1992) (unpublished draft, on file at Boston University).
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E. Margins and Stock Market Volatility
Margin requirements on stock transactions were first instituted
by the United States Congress in 1934 in the aftermath of the Crash of
1929. The restrictions on margins limited the level of credit which
buyers of stocks could secure from brokers. There were several justi-
fications proposed for the margin requirements. First, it was argued
that high margins would redirect capital away from stock investments
to more "productive" investment. Second, high margins would limit
default losses sustained by brokers. Lastly, high margins would drive
away from the stock market overleveraged speculators who were
thought to exert a destabilizing influence on stock prices. 66
The Federal Reserve was granted jurisdiction over the level of
initial margin but the level of maintenance margins was left at the
discretion of securities exchanges.67 The Federal Reserve changed the
initial margin level only twenty-two times between 1935 and 1974,
when the initial margin was set at fifty percent of the price of the
stock. This level has not changed since then. The Federal Reserve
now believes that fine-tuning margins is not an appropriate tool to
control speculation and price volatility. In testimony before the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Chairman Green-
span stated that "the primary purpose of margins [is] to protect the
clearing organizations, brokers, and other intermediaries from credit
losses that could jeopardize contract performance. 68
Until quite recently, initial and maintenance margins in futures
markets were set by the futures exchanges and their clearinghouses.
In 1993, however, the Federal Reserve was given authority over fu-
tures margins for stock index products.69 The Federal Reserve
promptly delegated this authority to the CFTC in the same way that
they had done to the SEC years ago regarding stock index and indi-
vidual stock options.70 Futures exchanges continue to set their mar-
gins, but under the supervision of the CFTC.
66 See Virginia G. France, The Regulation of Margin Requirements, in MERGERS AND MAR-
KET INTREGRrry 15 (Lester G. Telser ed., 1991).
67 Initial margins are the minimum deposits which customers must deposit on purchases of
stocks financed by brokers or on short-sales of stocks. Maintenance Margins specify the level of
the margin account below which the broker must issue a margin call to replenish the customer's
account and bring it back to the maintenance level.
68 Hearing on the SEC/CFTC Jurisdiction and Margin Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1990)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
69 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1992).
70 58 Fed. Reg. 26,979 (May 6, 1993).
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The different history of regulation of stock and futures margins
reflects important differences between the two. Stock margins consti-
tute a down payment on the current purchase of an asset. Stock mar-
gins therefore imply an extension of credit. Futures margins, on the
other hand, are purely performance bonds. A futures transaction is
not a transfer of assets and therefore involves no extension of credit.
Futures margins are the good faith deposits required by exchanges to
ensure performance of a futures contract. This essential difference be-
tween stock and futures margins is epitomized by the observation that,
while stock markets could operate without a margin mechanism, fu-
tures markets cannot operate without one since every position, long or
short, hedged or unhedged, requires performance bond "margins."
Stock and futures margins were a dead issue by October 1987.
An extensive literature on the relationship between margins and price
volatility7' had shown that using margins to fine-tune price volatility is
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This view was
echoed in a 1984 study by the Federal Reserve System.72 The com-
mon verdict of the studies was that low margins do not cause price
instability, and that margin increases are not stabilizing. These studies
documented how margin changes initially occur in reaction to preced-
ing changes in price volatility and found that the correlation between
margin changes and subsequent price volatility is insignificant and
temporary. The studies also concluded that the only apparent effect
of margin increases is to decrease trading volume and impair liquid-
ity.73 This tends to increase short-term price volatility because price
adjustments are more abrupt in thin markets.
Furthermore, it was generally well understood that futures ex-
changes and futures brokers (known as futures commisions
merchants) have a strong natural incentive to set margins at prudent
levels to avoid customer defaults. Consistent with this, a number of
71 Comprehensive surveys of these and more recent studies are Don M. Chance, The Effect
of Margins on Volatility of Stock and Derivative Markets: A Review of the Evidence (Apr.
1990) (working paper, on file at the Center for Study of Futures and Options Markets, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University); and Virginia G. France, The Regulation of Margin
Requirements: A Survey (1990) (mimeograph). See also, Theodore E. Day and Craig M. Lewis,
Initial Margin Policy and Volatility in the Crude Oil Futures Market (1992) (mimeograph);
Girard Gennotte and Hayne Leland, Low Margins, Derivative Securities and Volatility (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file at the University of California at Berkeley); FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO FED LETTER: FuTURs MARGIN AND ExcEss VoLATILrry
No. 46 (1991).
72 BOARD OF GovERNoRs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM, A REVIEW AND EVALUA-
TION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REQumEMENTS 159-65 (1984).
73 H.R. REP. No. 6, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1988).
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empirical analyses of the efficacy of futures margins found that futures
exchanges and brokers set their margins at prudent levels.74
The events of October 19, 1987 nevertheless revived concerns
about stock index futures margins. Critics argued that unregulated
and unduly low stock index futures margins had contributed to price
volatility. In spite of the strong empirical record on the effectiveness
of futures margins, the SEC and the Brady Commission proposed to
increase stock index futures margins to prevent further stock market
turbulence.
In its report, the Brady Commission 7 also called for the "harmo-
nization" of stock and stock index futures margins, a thesis which gen-
erally ignored the basic differences between stock margins and futures
margins. First, as noted above, stock and futures margins have differ-
ent functions: stock margins restrict the amount of credit extended to
customers; futures margins are a performance bond. Second, the risks
and expected default losses differ between the stock and futures mar-
kets. The risks are smaller for futures because the volatility of a stock
index price is lower than the volatility of individual stocks.76 This is
because a stock index represents a diversified basket of stocks. Fur-
ther, default risk is smaller for futures positions because futures mar-
gin variation payments are made daily or even more frequently when
prices become volatile. In comparison, stock investors who buy on
margin have five complete business days (the length of time it cur-
rently takes to clear transactions) to comply with the initial margin
requirement set by Regulation T. Settlement of accounts with margin
balances lower than maintenance level normally takes two to three
days.
After October 1987, regulators persuaded futures exchanges to
increase their stock index margins to levels well beyond prudent
levels. Between October 1987 and June 1992, speculative margins on
S&P 500 more than quadrupled from $5,000 to $22,000. In June, 1992,
the speculative margins were reduced to $12,000, and were reduced
even lower to $8,000 in 1993. But, because of renewed regulatory con-
cerns, the S&P 500 margins were increased again in February 1994 to
$11,250. In light of the historical distribution of daily S&P 500 price
changes, the relative size of current S&P 500 margins ($11,250) re-
mains substantially larger than the margins of other futures contracts.
74 See France, supra note 66, at a15-47.
75 See generally, BRADY REPORT, supra note 21.
76 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO FED LETrER: SETTING FUTURES MAR-
oINS: WHO? ... AND How HIGH? No. 9 (1988).
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At the current level of margins in the S&P 500, the stock market
would have to drop more than 22.5 S&P points (equal to approxi-
mately 165 in the Dow Jones Average, or approximately four percent)
to exhaust the margin on deposit. But the nature of the exchange's
intraday margins variations system with intraday mark-to-market calls
would require new funds to replenish the performance bond "margin"
on deposit in any case.
The successive margin increases imposed by regulators since Oc-
tober 1987 have disregarded the empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between margins and volatility, and the past record of margin
performance. In the history of the CME (which dates back to 1898),
no clearing member firm has ever defaulted on its obligations to the
Clearing House or to its customers. Even after the crash of October
1987, no futures firms failed. This strongly suggests that futures ex-
changes have been successful in setting stock index futures margins at
"prudential" levels.
VII. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OFFER AND SALE OF
FOREIGN STOCK INDEX FuTuREs AND OPTIONs
While the international trading world has gotten smaller and eas-
ier to access, stringent United States regulatory requirements exist for
any person attempting to offer or sell a futures contract based on a
foreign securities index or group.77 The remainder of this paper will
address those regulatory requirements while also reviewing the regu-
latory developments which led to the current requirements for the ap-
praisal of stock index futures and options. Also, it will examine some
of the regulatory developments and the issues which remain with re-
spect to other equity derivatives.
A. Who Regulates Equity Derivatives?
The dynamic growth in stock index derivatives has also been ac-
companied by regulatory uncertainty. The confusion arises from the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Stated generally, the CFTC has jurisdiction over commodity78 futures
77 Domestic Offer and Sale of the Financial News Composite Index Futures Contract, CFTC
Interpretative Letter No. 85-5, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH)
22,751, at 31,125 (Sept. 5, 1985).
78 The CEA defines a commodity as agricultural products and all services, rights and inter-
ests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt. Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1992).
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contracts and options on futures contracts,79 including futures on
stock indices and options on futures on stock indices.80 The SEC has
jurisdiction over securities and options on securities,8' including op-
tions on stock indices.82 However, if an instrument is both a security
and a futures contract, the CFTC has sole jurisdiction.83 But, if an
instrument is both a futures contract and an option on a security, then
the SEC has sole jurisdiction.84 The problem is that the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) does not define "contracts... for future deliv-
ery" or "option"85 and "[equity derivative] instruments may have as-
pects of [both options and futures contracts]."8 6
B. The Johnson-Shad Agreement
In December 1981, the Chairmen of the CFTC 87 and SEC88 an-
nounced an agreement (the Johnson-Shad Agreement, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Accord") defining which equity index instruments
were subject to the jurisdiction of the respective agencies. The sub-
stance of their agreement, with certain changes, was passed by Con-
gress in 1982 as part of the CFTC reauthorization process.89 The
provisions of the Accord respecting stock index futures are found in
Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA.90 Section 2(a)(1)(B) provides that
any application to trade futures on a stock index, in addition to meet-
ing the requirements for designation of a contract market,91 must also
meet the following minimum requirements:
1. The stock index futures contract must be settled in cash;
79 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1982).
80 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1982).
81 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1992); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(iv)(1).
82 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(iv)(1) (1982).
83 Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 883 F.2d 537 (7th
Cir. 1989).
84 Id.
85 Lester Telser, Futures and Actual Markets: How They Are Related, 59 J. Bus. 85 (1986).
86 Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 883 F.2d at 538.
87 Philip McBride Johnson was the Chairman of the CFTC.
88 John S.R. Shad was the Chairman of the SEC.
89 The Commodity Exchange Act implements the terms of the Accord. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a
(1982).
90 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1982) (giving the CFTC jurisdiction over
stock index futures meeting the requirements enumerated therein).
91 A contract market is a board of trade or exchange that has been designated by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission to serve as a market for the trading of a particular com-
modity futures contract. See General Guide, 1 Commodity Futures. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 131 (Feb.
1994). The requirements for designation of a contract market are found in the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1992).
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2. Trading in such contract "shall not be readily susceptible to manipula-
tion of the price of such contract... nor to causing or being used in
the manipulation of the price of any underlying security, option on
such security or option on a group or index including such securities;"
3. The stock index "shall be predominately composed of the securities
of unaffiliated issuers and shall be a widely published measure of, and
shall reflect, the market for all publicly traded equity or debt securi-
ties or a substantial segment thereof, or shall be comparable to such
measure."
92
In addition to the above requirements, Section 2(a)(1)(B)(iii) of
the CEA requires the CFTC, upon application by a board of trade for
designation as a contract market, to provide an opportunity for public
comment on whether such contracts meet the three minimum require-
ments set forth above.93 Finally, Section 2(a)(1)(B)(iv) of the CEA
requires the CFTC, for any application submitted after December 9,
1982, to transmit a copy of the application to the SEC for review. The
CFTC cannot approve the application of a stock index futures con-
tract (or option thereon) if the SEC determines that the contract fails
to meet any of the three above requirements of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii)
of the CEA.94
The requirements of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the CEA were
designed to permit innovative financial instruments "while at the same
time [assuring] that futures trading is limited to broad-based.., indi-
ces that are not conducive to manipulation or disruption of the market
for the underlying securities. 95
The central theme of Congress in its oversight responsibilities of
futures markets is to "ensure fair practices and honest dealing..."
with "control over manipulative activity in futures markets. '96 When
reviewing the Accord, the House Committee on Agriculture stated:
It is the hope that the jurisdictional accord will turn the focus of debate
from the issue of which agency has or should have jurisdiction [to] the
merits of the proposals made to the agencies. This resolution should
serve the public interest, in general, and business, commerce and invest-
ments, in particular, by removing impediments to useful new instruments
92 Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1982).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See Letter from Kenneth M. Raisler, General Counsel, CFTC, to Richard H. Rowe, Esq.,
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelson (Apr. 19, 1984) (on file with author) [hereinafter Raisler
Letter], citing S. Rep. No. 390, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982). See also H.R. Rep. No. 565, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 39 (1982).
96 Memorandum from Kenneth M. Raisler, General Counsel, CFTC to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 23, 1983) (on file with author), citing S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong.,
2d. Sess. 14 (1974). See also S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
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so that in meritorious cases their benefits could be made available with-
out undue delay.9
7
The main concern of the SEC with regard to stock index futures
and options thereon is the prevention of manipulation in the underly-
ing securities markets.9" According to the SEC:
[i]n varying degrees, all three requirements [of the Accord] serve to en-
sure that trading in a proposed futures contract based on a stock index
or group not be readily susceptible to manipulation, not to causing or
being used in manipulation the price of the underlying securities or re-
lated options.99
As Chairman Johnson observed, "the cash settlement require-
ment of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) serves as an anti-manipulative device,
[t]his feature [cash settlement] greatly reduces the potential for ma-
nipulation since futures contracts cannot be converted into a cash
market instrument."'100
The second requirement of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) states that the
index must not be readily susceptible to manipulation. Several SEC
"no objection" letters concerning various applications for contract
market designation as a stock index future are illustrative of what fac-
tors the SEC reviews when considering the application.10 1
Manipulation in the securities markets generally refers to prac-
tices "intended to mislead investors by affecting market activity."'"
According to Chairman Johnson, if an index "contains a substantial
97 H.R. Rep. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 40 (1982).
98 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1982) (statement of Chairman Shad). See Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 120 (1982) (statement of Chair-
man Shad noting that the compromise was designed to avoid manipulation in the underlying
securities).
99 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 147 (1982) (letter
from Edward Greene, SEC General Counsel, to the Honorable Timothy Wirth). See also id. pt.
2, at 243; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982) (joint explanatory statement); id. at 56 (state-
ment of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the SEC).
100 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 272, 273 (1982)
(statement of Chairman Johnson).
101 Letter from Brandon Becker, Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation, to David R.
Merrill, Deputy General Counsel, CFTC (July 18, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Becker Letter]. See also Letter from William H. Heyman, Director, SEC Division of Market
Regulation, to Joanne T. Medero, General Counsel, CFTC (Aug. 23, 1991) (on file with author)
and Letter from Richard G. Ketcham, Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation, to Paula
Tosini, Director, CFTC Division of Economic Analysis (July 5, 1985) (on file with author).
102 Santa Fe Industries, Ina v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
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number of different stocks having huge capitalization bases," the
chance of manipulation in the underlying securities markets would be
"extremely remote.' 03 And, as the SEC has noted,
[S]ecurities with active and deep trading markets, as well as with broad
public ownership, are more difficult to manipulate than securities having
less active and deep markets...104
The third enumerated requirement of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) is
that the index must be composed of a substantial segment of the mar-
ket for all public debt and equity securities. Chairman Johnson de-
scribed what constitutes a "substantial segment":
A group of stocks is considered a substantial segment of the market if it
represents a recognizable broad industry sector, comprised of numerous
securities not dominated by a single (or very few) issuer(s) such as utili-
ties, business machines, airlines, etc.105
The underlying concern of the SEC with respect to the require-
ment for a "substantial segment" of the market is to ensure that a
stock index futures contract will not function as a surrogate for trading
in individual securities or options of those securities. 10 6 This require-
ment also serves to meet the alleged competitive concerns raised by
the regulatory differences between the futures and securities markets
or possible insider trading concerns regarding a security underlying an
index through transactions in the futures market (or option market
thereon). 10 7
With the strong concern by the SEC on the possibility of manipu-
lation of the underlying securities markets and the emphasis on the
desire for broad-based indices, the Accord settled the questions con-
cerning the jurisdictional issues regarding the approval of large com-
posite indices. However, the Accord left unanswered the
jurisdictional issues regarding the regulation of industry sector indices.
C. Domestic Industry Sector Indices
Shortly after the Accord was reached and prior to the time Con-
gress enacted the Accord into law, the CME ignited a controversy
103 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 273 (1982) (letter
from Philip M. Johnson to the Hon. lmothy Wirth).
104 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,975 (July 21, 1983), 48 Fed. Reg. 33,389, 33,390.
105 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 273 (1982).
106 Letter from William H. Heyman, Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation, to Paula






when it filed applications to trade futures on a series of S&P stock
"sector" indices.
The SEC reviewed the CME's application for the S&P Consumer
Staples Index futures contracts and did not object to the application.
The CFTC then approved the application in 1983. In reviewing the
CME application for the futures contracts on the S&P Energy Index,
the SEC objected to the application. 08 The CFTC eventually ap-
proved the CME application over the SEC's objection.' 0 9
During the review of these applications, the CFTC and SEC had
quite different interpretations of the Accord. As previously discussed,
the Accord's requirements were established with broad-based indices
in mind. Since the agencies had not specifically addressed the case of
industry sector indices in the Accord, they had differences over how
the Accord should be interpreted in reviewing the application for
these indices. Therefore, in order to avert possible litigation between
the agencies, on January 18, 1984, they issued a Joint Interpretation
and Policy Statement regarding the designation criteria for futures
contracts involving non-diversified stock indices of domestic" 0 issuers
(Joint Interpretation). The Joint Interpretation set forth the following
criteria:
1. The index must have at least twenty-five constituent stocks.
2. The aggregate capitalization must be at least seventy-five billion
dollars.
3. No single stock may have a capitalization exceeding twenty five per-
cent of the aggregate capitalization of the index.
4. In a cap-weighted index, the three largest stocks may not exceed
forty-five percent of the aggregate capitalization of the index.
11
The Joint Interpretation became effective as of January 18, 1984,
for both future applications and those submitted prior to January 18,
1984 which had not yet received approval for designation by the
CFTC.112 The Joint Interpretation also stated that a domestic industry
sector index must not only meet these requirements at the time of
108 Note that the SEC's statutory veto power did not apply to the S&P Energy Index because
the CME's application had been submitted before December 1992. See 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (1982).
109 Letter from Jane Stuckey, Secretary, CFrC to Clayton Yeutter, President, Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (Feb. 22, 1983) (on file with author).
110 This agreement only involved United States stock indices and did not speak at all to the
designation of foreign industry sector indices. See Letter from Jane Stuckey, Secretary, CFTC to
Clayton Yeutter, President, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Jan. 11, 1984) (on file with author).
111 Designation Criteria for Futures Contracts and Options on Futures Contracts Involving
Non-Diversified Stock Indexes of Domestic Issuers, 49 Fed. Reg. 2884 (1984).
112 Id. at 2885.
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designation, but also must continue to meet the requirements after
approval for designation.1 1 3
The other S&P industry sector indices in which the CME sought
approval for designation were not approved for futures trading be-
cause they failed to meet one or more of these requirements.
Because the requirements pertaining to stock index futures im-
posed by the Accord and the Joint Interpretation do not apply to
stock index options traded on securities exchanges, the SEC has ap-
proved applications by securities exchanges to trade narrow-based in-
dex options based on the stocks of a single industry or industry group
that might not have satisfied the criteria for contract market designa-
tion set forth in the joint interpretation." 4 For a decade, the SEC
considered such applications by securities exchanges on a case-by-case
basis. In June 1994, the SEC approved the following listing standards
for options on narrow based stock indices:
1. The index must include at least ten component stocks, each of which
must be traded on a United States exchange or Nasdaq.
2. The component stocks comprising the top ninety percent of the index,
by weight, must have a minimum market of seventy-five million dol-
lars and a monthly trading volume of at least one million shares per
month.
3. The component stocks constituting the bottom ten percent of the in-
dex, by weight, must have a minimum market capitalization of fifty
million dollars and a monthly trading volume of at least five hundred
thousand shares per month.
4. No individual stock may represent more than twenty-five percent of
the weight of the index. Where the index has fewer than twenty-five
stocks, the top five stocks may not constitute more than sixty percent
of the weight of the index.
5. No more than twenty percent of the stocks in the index, by weight,
may be comprised of foreign securities or American Depository Re-'
ceipts ("ADRs") that are not subject to a surveillance agreement be-
tween the United States options exchange and the foreign exchange
where the stocks are traded.
6. The index value must be disseminated at least once every fifteen
seconds during trading hours. The index must be cash settled, and its
settlement value must be based upon the opening prices of the com-
ponent stocks on the primary exchange (or Nasdaq) on which they
are traded." 5
Why does the SEC give more lenient treatment to stock index
option contracts over stock index futures contracts? The SEC did not
113 Id.
114 59 Fed. Reg. 30,062 (1994).




address the differences in its release concerning the establishment of
the new options guidelines." 6 However, insight can be gained by
looking at the 1983 letter from the SEC to the CFTC, in which the
SEC objected to the approval of the CME applications in the S&P
Energy Index futures contract, the S&P High Tech Index futures con-
tract, the S&P Utilities Index futures contract, and the S&P Financial
Index futures contract. 1 7 The objections raised in the letter focused
on two of the three provisions of the Accord.
Since the indices were all cash settled, the SEC had no problem
with that provision. The SEC stated that in reviewing an equity index
futures contract for potential manipulation, the following five areas
are reviewed:
1. the number of securities in the index;
2. the capitalization of the securities in the index;
3. the depth and liquidity of the secondary market for those securities;
4. the diversification of the group or index; and
5. whether the index is price or capitalization weighted. 18
After comparing the index to the five areas above, the SEC
makes a determination of whether it feels the contract is susceptible to
manipulation. The SEC does not provide an analysis of the impact of
the raw numbers. The overall premise of the SEC is that the fewer
stocks in an index, especially if one stock is heavily weighted, the
more susceptible it is to manipulation. In only one case in the SEC
letter does the SEC give a specific possibility for manipulation - the
S&P High Technology Stock Index. The SEC was concerned that
IBM had a weighing of almost forty percent. The SEC was concerned
about the possibility of a "mini-manipulation,""' 9 even while acknowl-
edging that this strategy would be riskier in the futures markets than if
done in the market for IBM options. This fear should be lessened in
light of the intermarket coordination efforts that were established be-
tween the regulators and the options, futures, and stock exchanges
after 1987.
116 hd
117 Letter from George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission to
David Homer, Director, CFTC Division of Economics and Education (Nov. 29, 1983) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Fitzsimmons Letter].
118 Id.
119 In this context, the SEC described a "mini-manipulation" arising when a person with a
substantial pre-existing futures position attempted to move the prices of one of the securities in
the index in order to profit his futures position. The SEC's rationale was that because of the
highly leveraged nature of the index, a very small movement in stocks constituting even a mod-
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The SEC's basis for the "substantial segment" test is to prevent
trading in the futures markets from disrupting the securities markets
and undermining the scheme of regulation in place under federal se-
curities laws.120 In this regard, the SEC has expressed two public in-
terest concerns: insider trading and using the futures markets as a
surrogate for trading individual stocks or options on the underlying
stocks.
In objecting to the application for the S&P Energy Index futures
contract, the SEC was concerned that since Exxon constituted fifteen
percent of the index, the index could be used to profit from inside
information concerning that security.12 1 Again, the SEC acknowl-
edged that this would involve more risk than trading in the underlying
market of Exxon common stock or in the market for Exxon options.
The risk relates to the various other stocks in the index and their col-
lective impact on the index. The SEC implies that a person trading on
inside information could hedge this risk by investing in each of the
underlying securities. As the CFTC noted in its approval of the En-
ergy Index futures contract, one with inside information could just as
easily trade those stocks (or their options) most closely related in
price to the one to which the inside information pertains. Since this
would be more efficient in the market for the underlying securities or
individual stock options than in an index of stocks in the futures mar-
ket, why would the trader choose the riskier strategy? And, if this
strategy would be legal and more efficient in the cash or options mar-
ket, why is the SEC more concerned with the less likely possibility in
the futures market?
The SEC is also concerned that the futures contract may be used
as a surrogate for trading in the individual stocks or options thereon.
The SEC conceded that an investor that is bullish on the entire indus-
try, but not any particular stock, is well-suited to trading in the futures
contract. The SEC's stated major concern (which it did not prove)
was the perception by registered representatives and their customers
that movements in the index are sufficiently close to those in the un-
derlying cash and options market. The CFTC also noted that similar
concerns were raised by the SEC with respect to interest-rate futures
at the inception of trading in these instruments, and these contracts
are often dependent on a smaller number of individual securities, al-
beit United States Treasury Securities, than the forty common stocks
in the S&P Energy Index. Therefore, absent the demonstration of an
120 Fitzsimmons Letter, supra note 115.
121 Fitzsimmons Letter, supra note 115.
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empirical basis, the CFTC reasoned that this is not a legitimate con-
cern of the SEC.
There have been few developments in recent years, since United
States futures exchanges have not introduced new sector indexes, pri-
marily due to lack of investor demand. The securities options ex-
changes have introduced several sector indexes such as energy,
telecommunications, financial, utilities, and high technology with a
limited degree of success.
D. Foreign Stock Index Futures
Although there are no specific rules for foreign stock index fu-
tures, the CFTC and SEC use the statutory requirements for domestic
stock index futures found in Section 2(a)(1)(B) 122 to determine
whether to allow the foreign stock index futures contract to be offered
and sold to United States investors. This is the case whether a United
States exchange wants to designate a foreign stock index futures con-
tract (or option thereon) as a contract market or whether a foreign
exchange is seeking approval for the sale of the foreign stock index
futures contract (or option thereon) to United States customers.
1. Foreign Boards of Trade Offering Stock Index Futures in the
United States.
Foreign futures markets (hereinafter referred to as a foreign
board of trade) generally do not wish to be designated as a contract
market, because they would then fall under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC and the CFTC rules pertaining to domestic exchanges in addi-
tion to the rules of their own country's regulators. To facilitate the
sale of foreign stock index futures in the United States, the CFTC has
initiated a procedure whereby the foreign board of trade may apply to
the CFTC for certification that its futures contract meets the require-
ments of the Accord' 23 without seeking or obtaining designation from
the CFTC as a contract market. The foreign board of trade must also
122 See e.g., Letter from Kenneth Raisler, General Counsel, CFTC, to Richard Rowe, Esq.,
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn (Apr. 19, 1983) (on file with author). The letter granted
approval for the Toronto Futures Exchange TSE "300" Composite Index Futures Contract.
123 The legislative history of the CEA provides:
[N]othing in the provisions [of the CEA] prevents a foreign board of trade from applying to
the CFTC for certification that its futures contracts conform with the requirements of the
[CEA] where, by its terms, the [CEA] establishes minimum requirements for a specifically
identified contract. For example, a foreign board of trade may seek certification from the
[CFrC] that a futures contract offered by it that is based upon a group or index of American
securities meets the minimum requirements specified in subparagraphs (a) through (c) of
Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the [CEA], without seeking or obtaining designation of the [CFTC]
as contract market. Any such certification is to be conducted under the procedures in the
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adhere to the requirements of Part Thirty of the Commission's
regulations.
124
In addition, the foreign board of trade may be required to pro-
vide additional information deemed necessary by the CFTC and
SEC."2 In fact, the CFTC has enumerated the information to be in-
cluded in any "no-action"'12 6 request by a foreign board of trade which
is seeking approval for a foreign stock index futures contract without
designation as a contract market. The following list of information
allows the CFTC and the SEC to review the application to determine
if the foreign equity index futures contract or options meet the re-
quirements of Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii):
1. The terms and conditions of the contract and all other relevant rules
of the exchange, and if applicable, of the exchange on which the un-
derlying equities are traded, which have an effect on the over-all trad-
ing of the contract, including circuit breakers, price limits, position
limits or other controls on trading;
2. Surveillance agreements between the foreign boards of trade and the
exchange(s) on which the underlying equities are traded;
3. When applicable, information regarding foreign blocking statutes and
their impact on the ability of the United States government agencies
to obtain information concerning the trading of such contracts; and
4. Information and data relating to:
(a) The computation, availability, and timeliness of the index;
(b) The total capitalization, number of stocks, and weighting of the
stocks by capitalization and, if applicable, by price, in the index;
(c) Breakdown of the index by industry segment;
(d) Procedures and criteria for selection of individual stocks for in-
clusion in, or removal from the index;
(e) Method of calculation of the cash-settlement price and the timing
of its public release;
(f) Average daily volume of trading by calendar month in each of the
underlying equities for a six month period of time, and separately,
the daily volume in each underlying stock for six expirations
(cash-settlement dates) or for the six days of that period on which
provision of the [CEA] establishing such minimum requirements. H.R. Rep. No. 565, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 85 (1982).
See also, B3ecker Letter, supra note 99.
124 17 C.F.R. §§ 30.01-30.11 (1994).
125 See Economic and Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market Designation, 57 Fed.
Reg. 3518, 3523 (1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 5).
126 A "no-action" position is an assurance from the CFTC staff that, based upon representa-
tions made by the inquirer, the staff would recommend that the Commission take "no-action"





cash-settlement would have occurred had each month of the pe-
riod been an expiration month.127
2. Domestic Exchanges Offering Foreign Stock Index Futures
While the above list of information was not published by the SEC
and CFTC until January 30, 1992, the SEC and CFrC had been re-
quiring this information of domestic exchanges seeking approval for
designation of foreign stock index futures as contract markets well
before this time. Although not required by the CEA, the SEC and
CFTC have nevertheless preconditioned the approval for contract
designation until the domestic futures exchange received a surveil-
lance information sharing agreement with the foreign securities ex-
change where the underlying stocks are traded.
A case study illustrating this point can be seen in the CME's ap-
plication for the designation of futures on the Nikkei 225 Index as a
contract market. The CME applied for designation with the CFTC on
August 26, 1986. Shortly after receiving the application, the CFTC
advised the CME that the SEC would object to the application unless
the CME entered into a surveillance information sharing agreement
with the Tokyo Stock Exchange.2 8 The Tokyo Stock Exchange did
not initially want to enter into this type of an agreement with the
CME - for competitive reasons. The CME was finally able to enter
into an agreement with the Tokyo Stock Exchange on June 1, 1988 -
almost two years later!
The SEC notified the CFTC that it would raise no objection to
the application on April 25, 1988 - prior to the signing of the surveil-
lance agreement. 129 The SEC knew that the CME had used its best
efforts to reach an agreement with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The
SEC was able to rely upon the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that it had entered into with the Japanese Ministry of Finance
on May 23, 1986. This MOU was an agreement between the two
government agencies to facilitate each agency's respective requests for
surveillance and investigation information.3 0 The SEC was also as-
sured by the Japanese that the MOU included stock indices.
127 Economic and Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market Designation, 57 Fed.
Reg. 3518 (1992).
128 For a summary of the events, see Letter from Leo Melamed, Chairman, CME, to Takashi
Suzuki, Managing Director, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (June 3, 1987) (on file with author).
129 The CFTC did not approve the contract until after the agreement had been signed.
130 Report of the SEC to the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce on the Internationaliza-
tion of the Securities Markets, [1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 84,294 (Oct. 29,
1986).
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Although the benefits of a surveillance information sharing
agreement are obvious, these agreements are often difficult for do-
mestic exchanges to procure because of competitive reasons. In the
CME's case, the Tokyo Stock Exchange did not decide to enter into
the agreement until it was only a month away from launching its own
Tokyo Stock Price Index futures contract (TOPIX). By waiting al-
most two years for approval, the CME lost any competitive lead it
might have gained over the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
In my opinion, it was unfair and contrary to United States inter-
ests to permit the Tokyo Stock Exchange effectively to block approval
of the CME's application, thereby damaging the ability of the United
States markets to compete with Japanese markets with respect to
stock index futures. And, since it was lawful for United States inves-
tors to purchase individual Japanese stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (without any surveillance agreement in place), no signifi-
cant regulatory purpose was served by requiring the surveillance in-
formation sharing agreement. The delay simply prevented United
States investors from hedging their Japanese stock positions with Nik-
kei futures contracts on the CME.
As previously mentioned, nothing in the CEA explicitly requires
a surveillance agreement between exchanges. It simply requires that
the proposed futures contract will not be readily susceptible to manip-
ulation nor to being used to manipulate any underlying security. Even
though it might appear that the SEC has created a level playing field
by "requiring" both foreign markets and domestic exchanges to have
surveillance information sharing agreements with the underlying se-
curities exchange (or at least requiring the domestic exchange to use
its best efforts to procure an agreement), the competitive realities
present a huge burden to domestic exchanges which can result in a
very uneven playing field.
3. Must Diversified Foreign Stock Index Futures be Judged by
Domestic, Non-Diversified Stock Indices Standards?
A recent trend of the SEC seems to be to judge diversified stock
indices of foreign issuers according to the Joint Interpretation, which
establishes the designation criteria for non-diversified stock indices of
domestic issuers' 3 ' of futures contracts. The SEC has also recently
treated diversified foreign stock indices (for trading on United States
options exchanges) with relatively few stocks in the index (fifteen for




one index and ten stocks in another index) as narrow-based indices in
light of the limited number of stocks in each index.132
The recent no-action relief granted to the Spanish futures ex-
change, MEFF RV,133 for futures trading based on the IBEX-35 in-
dex' 34 illustrates this recent practice by the SEC. The thirty-five
stocks represent over eighty percent of the total market capitalization
and include thirteen major industry groups. The largest stock repre-
sents fourteen percent of the total weight of the index, while the top
five stocks represent approximately fifty percent of the index
weight.135
In a letter to the CFTC dated July 18, 1994,136 the SEC stated that
it had no objection if the CFTC grants a no-action position to permit
the offer and sale of IBEX-35 futures to United States citizens. In
applying the three statutory requirements of Section 2(a)(1)(B), the
SEC devoted most of its attention to the third requirement that the
index reflect a substantial segment of the market "to ensure that a
securities index futures contract will not function as a surrogate for
trading in individual securities or options on those securities."'137
After noting that the total capitalization of the stocks comprising
the IBEX-35 was approximately ninety-five billion dollars, represent-
ing over eighty percent of the total market capitalization, and that the
largest stock comprised approximately fourteen percent of the total
index value, the SEC concluded that the IBEX-35 met the statutory
requirement because it reflects a substantial segment of the market
for Spanish equity securities. In a footnote, the SEC measured the
IBEX-35 against the designation criteria for futures contracts involv-
ing non-diversified stock indices of domestic issuers as described
132 See Order Approving and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of
Amendments 3 and 4 to a Proposed Rule Change by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.,
Relating to the Listing of Options and Long-Term Options on the CBOE Israeli Index and
Long-Term Options on a Reduced-Value CBOE Israeli Index, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,804 (1994) and
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc. relating to Options on the CBOE Mexico Index, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,557
(1994).
133 The MEFF Sociedad Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable
(MEFF RV) is an official exchange and clearing house subject to regulatory oversight by the
Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CMVW). The MEFF RV is also a self-regulatory
body which employs its own staff to review compliance with its rules and to investigate customer
complaints. See Becker Letter, supra note 99.
134 The IBEX-35 index is based on the prices of the thirty-five most liquid stocks traded on
the four official Spanish exchanges.
135 See Becker Letter, supra note 99.
136 See Becker Letter, supra note 99.
137 See Becker Letter, supra note 99.
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above. Although the IBEX-35 satisfied those criteria, the SEC sug-
gested that its classification as a broad-based index was a close ques-
tion because the largest five stocks account for fifty percent of the
index weighing. It thus appears that the SEC will attempt to apply
those criteria even to a diversified index of foreign stocks.131 It is
clear that a diversified stock index futures contract will be under close
scrutiny from the SEC, as is stated in the recent letter from the SEC to
the CFTC regarding the IBEX-35 application:
In evaluating the potential for manipulation of the IBEX-35 futures con-
tract, the Division is concerned that the Index is comprised of only
thirty-five stocks. As a general matter, in comparison to an index with a
large number of stocks (e.g., more than one hundred stocks), if an index
is composed of a small number of stocks, it may be easier to manipulate
the index by manipulating the prices of the underlying stocks. For this
reason, the Division scrutinizes with more particularity indexes that are
composed of a small number of stocks and will not comment favorably
on them unless it can be demonstrated convincingly that the index repre-
sents a substantial capitalization and the component securities are ac-
tively traded. 3
Therefore, to receive designation as a contract market or a no-
action letter allowing for offer and sales of a stock index futures con-
tract, an exchange must meet the stringent requirements of Section
2(a)(1)(B)(ii). When the futures contract is based on an industry sec-
tor stock index, it must also meet the requirements of the Joint Inter-
pretation. The SEC has suggested that a diversified stock index
futures contract with less than one hundred underlying stocks may
also have to meet the additional requirements of the Joint Interpreta-
tion, although there appears to be no support for that approach in the
statutory language.
4. Part Thirty Rules
Exchanges and other persons interested in the offer and sale of
foreign futures contracts and options on futures contracts must also
adhere to the Part Thirty rules of the CFTC. 40 The Part Thirty rules
were first published on August 5, 1987, and became effective on Feb-
138 See Becker Letter, supra note 99 (referring "to an index with a large number of stocks,"
e.g., more than one hundred stocks).
139 See Becker Letter, supra note 99 (citing Letter from William H. Heyman, Director, SEC
Division of Market Regulation, to Joanne T. Medero, General Counsel, CFTC, dated Oct. 16,
1991 which raises no objection to the offer and sale to United States citizens of futures contracts
overlying the French CAC 40 Index).




ruary 1, 1988.141 These rules were put into effect to facilitate the ac-
cess of United States customers and firms to futures contracts in other
jurisdictions and to facilitate the mutual recognition of United States
brokers in foreign markets.142 Prior to these rules, the sale of foreign
futures to United States customers was largely unregulated.143 Wo of
the most important sections of Part Thirty are briefly discussed below
as they relate to the offer and sale of foreign stock index futures and
options thereon.
One of the most important provisions of the rule is Section
30.3(a), because it lifted the ban on the offer and sale of foreign op-
tions on futures contracts. 144 Rule 30.3(a) makes it unlawful for any
person to engage in the offer or sale of any foreign commodity option
until the CFrC, by order, authorizes the foreign option to be sold in
the United States. 145 The approval is made on a case-by-case basis. In
determining whether to grant the petition, the CFTC examines the
following criteria:
1. the existence of mechanisms for information-sharing and the ability
to confirm, among other things, transactions and prices;
2. the arrangements in place for assuring that sales practice abuses in
such options do not occur;
3. the forums available for the redress of customer complaints; and
4. the regulatory environment in which such foreign options are
traded.' 46
With respect to options on stock index futures contracts, the specific
requirements for approval are those discussed above (i.e., compliance
with Section 2(a)(1)(B)(ii)).
The other section of Part Thirty that is of special interest in the
sale of foreign stock index futures contracts and options thereon is
Section 30.10.147 Part Thirty rules require persons engaged in the of-
fer and sale of foreign futures contracts to United States citizens to
register with the Commission. Section 30.10 provides an exemption to
141 Foreign Futures and Foreign Options Transactions, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,980 (1987) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 30).
142 CFTC INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT 30 (1991) (report to Congress as required
by the Market Reform Act of 1990).
143 Id. (noting that sales were only subject to a general anti-fraud provision).
144 In 1978, in response to widespread scandals involving sales of unregulated commodity
options, the CFTC banned sales of essentially all commodity options, domestic and foreign, to
persons in the United States. John Riley and David Hartman, Offers and Sales of Foreign Com-
modity Futures Contracts and Options to Persons Located in the United States, 7 INr'L L. LETrER
4 (1992).
145 17 C.F.R. § 30.3(a) (1992).
146 Id.
147 17 C.F.R. § 30.10 (1992).
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this general rule for foreign persons located outside the United States
"based upon substituted compliance by the firm with comparable reg-
ulatory requirements imposed by the foreign jurisdiction.1" To re-
view for "comparability relief," the CFTC will examine:
1. registration, authorization or other form of licensing, fitness review or
qualification of persons through whom customer orders are solicited
and accepted;
2. minimum financial requirements for those persons who accept cus-
tomer funds;
3. protection of customer funds from misapplication;
4. record-keeping and reporting requirements;
5. minimum sales practice standards, including disclosure of the risks of
futures and options transactions and, in particular, the risk of transac-
tions undertaken outside the United States; and
6. procedures for auditing compliance with the requirements of the reg-
ulatory program.149
Section 30.10 is very specific with regard to what activities are
permitted in soliciting United States customers pursuant to this relief
from registration. To go beyond the specific criteria requires registra-
tion with the CFTC or specific relief from registration from the
CFTC.15 0
In summary, the Part Thirty rules have contributed to the global-
ization of the equity index futures and options market by allowing the
offer and sale of foreign equity index futures contracts and options
thereon to United States investors through grants of exemptive relief
from the CEA's registration requirements by the CFTC.
The SEC and CFTC have approved several major international
stock indices for trading in the United States, such as, the United
Kingdom's FTSE 100, the French CAC 40, the Spanish Meff RV
IBEX-35, Japan's Nikkei 225, the Australian All Ordinaries Index,
and the German Dax index. The review process can be a lengthy one
- sometimes taking as long as several years.
148 CFTC INTERMARKET COORDINATION REPORT, supra note 144, at 31.
149 CFrC INTE RMARKEr CooRDNATIoN REPORT, supra note 144, at 31.
150 See, e.g., Limited Marketing Activities from a United States Location by Certain Firms and
Their Employees or Other Representatives Exempted Under Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Rule 30.10, Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH) I 2705A (Oct. 28, 1992). Rule 30.10,
among other things, limits the duration and frequency of marketing activities firms and limits
sales via this exemptive relief to institutions and high net worth individuals.
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E. Recent Jurisdiction and Other Developments in Equity
Derivatives Since the Joint Interpretation & Policy
Statement Agreements of 1984
Since the Joint Interpretation of 1984, several equity derivative
products have been developed. Each application by an exchange for
approval by the CFTC (futures exchanges) or SEC (options and se-
curities exchanges) is carefully scrutinized by the CFrC and SEC (and
by other exchanges) to determine whether the instrument is a futures
contract or a securities contract. This section will briefly describe
some of the instruments that have had an impact in the equity deriva-
tives markets.
In 1988, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX), the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE), and the American Stock Ex-
change (AMEX) each submitted applications to the SEC to list Index
Participation products (IP's).151 IP's are products based on the cur-
rent value of an index of stocks. They are of infinite duration and
entitle the holders to receive cash payments on a quarterly basis
equivalent to a proportionate share of regular cash dividends declared
on the component stocks of the underlying index.'52 The CFTC,
CME, and the CBT, among others, commented to the SEC that these
products were futures contracts and would fall under the jurisdiction
of the CFTC.153 On April 11, 1989, the SEC approved the contracts.
In approving the contracts, the SEC claimed jurisdiction stating that
the products were securities and were not contracts for future deliv-
ery. 154 The following day the CME and CBT fied a petition for re-
view of the Commission's Order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the IP's were futures
contracts under the jurisdiction of the CFTC.155 The PHLX, CBOE,
and AMEX began trading in IP's on May 12, 1989, after a petition by
the CME and CBT to stay the SEC Order was denied on May 11,
1989. On August 18, 1989, the Seventh Circuit declared that the in-
struments were futures contracts. Judge Easterbrook's decision held
151 See Exchange Act Release No. 25,495, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,311 (Mar. 23, 1988) (Philadelphia
Stock Exchange); Exchange Act Release No. 26,058, 53 Fed. Reg. 35,247 (Sept. 2, 1988) (Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange); Exchange Act Release No. 25,799, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,754 (June 13,
1988)(CBOE); Exchange Act Release No. 25,644, 53 Fed. Reg. 16805 (May 5, 1988)(AMEX);
and Exchange Act Release No. 25,942, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,929 (July 25, 1988)(AMEX).
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Letters from Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC (Apr. 29, 1988; June 1, 1988; and July 8, 1988) (on file with author).
154 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes to the Listing and Trading of Index Participa-
tions, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26,709, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,280 (Apr. 11, 1989).
155 Petition No. 89-1763.
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that the instruments had an element of futurity even though the con-
tracts lacked another traditional attribute of futures contracts - bilat-
eral obligations.'5 6 The SEC appealed the decision, but later dropped
the appeal as the three options exchanges modified their products to
conform with the court's decision. The experience with these rede-
signed products has been that only the AMEX's SPDR offering has
shown any measure of success to date.
Also entering the marketplace in the last few years are put and
call warrants on foreign stock indices. These warrants are underwrit-
ten by independent issuers and are traded on a stock exchange. For
example, several broker-dealer parent companies issue put and call
warrants on various foreign stock indices on the AMEX. The put
warrants give the holder the right to receive from the issuer the cash
amount of any decline in the index below the specified strike level; the
call warrants give the holder the right to receive the cash amount of
any increase in the index above the strike price level. The warrants
are generally "American-style" and can be exercised into United
States dollars on any business day prior to expiration. In order to
offer these warrants, a firm must file a registration statement in ac-
cordance with the Securities Act of 1933, or be exempt from registra-
tion. The Exchange on which the warrants are listed submits rule
changes to the SEC for approval. In reviewing such foreign index
product, the SEC generally uses the same scrutiny as with exchange
created index options - requires a surveillance information sharing
agreement between the listing and the home country exchange.
Another important and recent development in the area of equity
derivatives is that of "FLEX options." FLEX options are options (in-
cluding those on equity indexes) traded on an exchange in which the
parties determine the strike price and expiration date. This develop-
ment allows a customer to customize an exchange-traded product to
best fit its specific needs. The CBOE has been successful with this
product which responds to the needs of sophisticated investors to have
an exchange traded and cleared product with some customized terms.
Another very interesting development in equity derivatives re-
cently occurred in Australia. On May 16, 1994, the Sydney Futures
Exchange Limited (SFE) began trading "Share Futures." Share Fu-
tures are futures contracts on an individual underlying stock traded on
the Australian Stock Exchange and included in the SFE's Share Price
156 In its opinion, the court stated that new products such as the IP may have aspects of
options and futures contracts and that the Court "must decide whether tetrahedrons belong in
square or round holes." Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 883 F.2d at 539.
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Index - a composite stock index futures contract which began trading
on the SFE in February 1983. As previously mentioned, futures con-
tracts based on individual stocks are not allowed on United States fu-
tures exchanges.15 7 The SFE currently offers Shares Futures based on
three listed companies: Broken Hill Proprietary, National Australia
Bank, and News Corporation. The SFE received approval for these
contracts from the Australian Securities Commission (ASC). 158 The
SFE and the Australian Stock Exchange jointly oversee the cash set-
tlement procedure for the Share Futures. The cash settlement proce-
dure was reported as "smooth" for the June 1994 and July 1994
settlements.159 The SFE listed four additional Share Futures contracts
in September 1994160 and may list one on shares of United States and
other non-Australian issues. This is an important development inas-
much as the creation of a futures market in individual stocks of
United States companies outside the United States, when prohibited
within the United States, could have significant international competi-
tive ramifications.
F. Summary
Securing permission to trade a stock index futures contract on an
industry sector or a foreign country's equities is a daunting project.
The SEC exerts powerful restraints on the expansion of products by
futures exchanges while permitting options exchanges, regulated by
the SEC, to offer options on narrowly based sector indices and foreign
equity indices with a small number of issues.
Both the regulatory and competitive rationales for the uneven
treatment of futures and options exchanges has evaporated. A com-
plementary relationship has grown up between the options and fu-
tures markets. They have recognized their mutual interests and
created cross-margining systems to facilitate hedging and arbitrage
transactions. They have developed cross-market surveillance systems
to protect the markets. The time has come for the regulators to drop
the artificial barriers.
157 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982) (CFTC jurisdiction limited to designation based on "a group or index
of securities").
158 In Australia, the futures market is regulated by the SFE and the ASC. Australian Corpo-
rations Law, ch. 8 cited in SFE Bulletin (Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd.) July-Aug. 1994.
159 SFE Buum! (Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd.), July-Aug. 1994 at 2.
160 The companies underlying these four new contracts are MIM Holdings, Western Mining
Corp., BTR Nylex, and Westpak Bank.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Stock index futures and options have revolutionized the way
stock markets around the world operate. Due to their versatility and
efficiency, they have been a positive and dynamic force in promoting
the growth and liquidity of the underlying stock markets.
These versatile instruments have promoted the internationaliza-
tion of the equity markets and have allowed international investors
access to certain markets where the use of the underlying market is
often impeded by regulatory or operational issues. We can expect to
see continued growth in the number of countries where these products
are traded, growth in the overall volumes, and continued innovation
in their use. It is critical that the regulatory scheme in the United
States recognizes this trend and provides a framework which allows
these markets to grow and prosper.
302
